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
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Department of Energy/
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March 1984

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DOE's role in MCTL process

DOE review completed.

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technology transfer

STIC: mission, functions, and products (U)

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STIC (the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee), one of the key organizations in the technology transfer arena, was born from a recognition of the importance of making continual assessments of foreign scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses, particularly in the Soviet Union, to support national security policy.

Under guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a committee structure was designed to focus and task Intelligence Community collection assets against scientific and technical intelligence issues and to provide for technical assessments of foreign technologies.

This early intelligence committee structure was subordinated to the US Intelligence Board (USIB), which has since evolved into the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) and the present DCI committee structure (Fig. 1).

Through this structure, the Intelligence Community can better direct intelligence collection through SIGINT, COMIREX, and HUMINT and produce finished intelligence and assessments for national level consumers through its production committees, of which STIC is one (the others being EIC, WSSIC, JAEIC, and TTIC).

Mission

Though STIC has been in existence for 20 years, its mission was updated and redescribed in DCI Directive for Foreign Scientific and Technical Intelligence (18 June 1982) as follows: "The Committee will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to production, coordination, and evaluation of intelligence on foreign scientific and technical developments and will promote the effective use of Intelligence Community resources for this purpose."

To fulfill this mission, STIC draws its primary membership from the NFIB community and supplements this expertise with associate members from other governmental departments that have overlapping interests with the Intelligence Community (Fig. 2).

Functions




STIC is functionally organized into an Executive Planning Group, the parent committee, a Scientific and Technical Collection Subcommittee (STIC-C), and 19 Working Groups (Fig. 3), 4 of which directly support the Collection Subcommittee.

Glossary

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
COMIREX	Committee on Imagery, Requirements, and Exploitation
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
EIC	Economic Intelligence Committee
EW	Electronic Warfare
HUMINT	Human Intelligence Committee
IC	Intelligence Community
JAEIC	Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
LASINT	Laser Intelligence
NFIB	National Foreign Intelligence Board
OUSDRE	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
PRC	People's Republic of China
S&T	Science and Technology
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence Committee
STIC	Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
TTIC	Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee
WSSIC	Weapons & Space Systems Intelligence Committee

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The working groups address those S&T issues generally described by their titles to produce technical assessments on their respective technologies, collection and requirements guides, inputs to national estimates, and special studies in support of requests stemming from national level consumers or the Intelligence Community.

STIC focuses on 2 key functions:

- preventing technological surprise and

- assessing current sciences and technologies.

Technological surprise

Technological surprise refers to the concern that the USSR or any adversary may make a sudden S&T breakthrough that could strongly disadvantage the US strategically or tactically and thereby threaten our national security.

Central to preventing technological surprise is an understanding of Soviet

technology, which depends on

1. access to technology information in the closed Soviet society that has adopted seemingly leak-proof security measures and
2. understanding the leading edge of US scientific and technical achievement. [Though this understanding will assist in evaluating the level of achievement in the Soviet Union in science and technology (S&T) areas where the

Please turn to p. 7

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DOE MCTL team continues work on Sec. 17 (U)

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Because the expertise for nuclear- and other energy-related technology rests within the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories, the Department of Defense, which has primary responsibility for the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), has made DOE responsible for MCTL Sec. 17, the nuclear energy section.

DOE's MCTL team is composed of a DOE program monitor (in the Office of International Security Affairs), a technical coordinator from Los Alamos National Laboratory, and technical resource people from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), Sandia National Laboratories—Albuquerque (SNLA), and Savannah River Laboratory (SRL). In addition, support for specific technical areas is sought from other DOE facilities as needed.

The DOE team meets 3 to 4 times a year at DOE sites or in Washington DC. Between meetings, members revise Sec. 17, write and revise Supporting Documentation for Sec. 17, and review other MCTL sections (for example, 1-3 and 6) relevant to DOE concerns.

Last year, the DOE team completely reorganized Sec. 17, ordering the subsections more logically and adding sections on magnetic flux compression generators and lithium isotope separation technologies. The team has also extensively rewritten some sections of Sec. 17 to ensure that it encompasses the very latest technology.

In addition, the team reviews its own work, so that team members with primary responsibility for a particular section benefit from the knowledge of other DOE experts.

DOE added cross references to all relevant control lists such as the Department of Commerce Commodity Control List (CCL), the Department of State Munitions List, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license list. DOE will continue to reference actual control documents where possible and is encouraging incorporating MCTL items into the CCL where appropriate.

At the team's meeting at LLNL in early November 1983, the group established the following tasks for the next MCTL review cycle.

1. Indicate for each critical element of each technology whether that element is recommended for control and the legal basis for its control. (In addition to the national security concerns that are addressed by DoD, one of DOE's major goals for its MCTL work is to augment government-wide efforts to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation.) Alternatively, a critical element may be listed for information purposes and because knowledge of its purchase could be a useful indicator of proliferation activities, but the element may not be recommended for control because of wide commercial use, wide foreign availability, or other reasons that make control unfeasible.
2. Refine and expand the Sec. 17 index. Because the best and clearest key words for indexing can probably be provided by the



Photo by Johnnie Martinez.

Arvid Lundy, DOE MCTL technical coordinator.

Technologies covered by the MCTL

Sec. 1	Computer System and Network Technology
Sec. 2	Computer Hardware Technology
Sec. 3	Computer Software Technology
Sec. 4	Automated Industrial Process Control Technology
Sec. 5	Materials Technology
Sec. 6	Directed Energy Technology
Sec. 7	Semiconductor and Electronic Component Technology
Sec. 8	Instrumentation Technology
Sec. 9	Telecommunications Technology
Sec. 10	Communication, Navigation, Guidance, Control, and Identification Technology
Sec. 11	Microwave Technology
Sec. 12	Vehicular Technology
Sec. 13	Optical and Low Energy Laser Technology
Sec. 14	Sensor Technology
Sec. 15	Undersea Systems Technology
Sec. 16	Chemical Technology
Sec. 17	Nuclear- and Energy-Related Technology
Sec. 18	Cryptologic Technology

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authors and reviewers of individual sections, the DOE team is adding that activity to this year's tasking.

3. Encourage, with DoD, use of the MCTL in a data base format for user convenience and to allow rapid updating. The MCTL exists on DoD's FORDTIS system to which, at present, no one in DOE has access. Ultimately, putting the MCTL on a system using artificial intelligence (expert systems) concepts is desirable. DOE has discussed putting MCTL Sec. 17 on such a system but does not have the funds to do so.
4. Recommend restructuring the non-nuclear energy subsections (12.7, 17.7, and 17.8) into a single section.
5. Try to expand use of the MCTL within DOE.

Because DOE has a strong desire to coordinate its activities with other government agencies that work on the MCTL, the team invites input from DoD and DOC at its meetings. For example, last July at a meeting in Washington DC, the team invited all interested parties to an open hearing on its latest Sec. 17 revision and incorporated suggestions from that meeting into the final draft submitted to DoD.

Last fall, John Boidock, Director of DOC's Office of Export Administration; Paul Hopler, DoD's MCTL coordinator; and [redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency, made valuable contributions to the DOE document.

If you have questions, comments, or suggestions for the DOE MCTL team, call Arvid Lundy, DOE MCTL Technical Coordinator, 505-667-6922 (FTS 843-6922) or Bob Cutter, acting DOE MCTL Program Monitor, 202-252-2155 (FTS 252-2155).

—Roz Newmyer
International Technology Division

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Criteria for judgment of criticality

The following criteria are adapted from a list drawn up for Air Force Systems Command by BK Dynamics.

Mission value	Technologies that support critical missions are strong candidates for export controls.
Technology impact in mission	Technologies that are crucial for certain missions and for which no viable alternative exists are very strong candidates for export controls.
Pervasiveness	Technologies that contribute some value to a wide variety of systems or missions are strong candidates for export controls.
Leverage	Success in warfare results from exploiting an adversary's weakness or capitalizing on one's own strength. Technologies that create or exploit asymmetries in this balance will be of high value to a potential adversary and are strong candidates for export controls.
Lead/lag	Technologies in which US industry possesses a demonstrable lead over Warsaw Pact industries are strong candidates for export controls.
Soviet targeting	Of the many technologies that are strong candidates for export control, high priority should be given to those the Soviets have targeted for acquisition.
Cost/simplicity	Technologies that radically lower cost or simplify operation are of great military value and should be considered for export controls.
Maturity of technology	Emerging technologies that have potential for a high payoff must be carefully guarded until their potential is fully understood.
Foreign availability	If a technology is critical but available from noncontrolled sources, it is a weak candidate for control.
Control feasibility	Controls for a technology must be both desirable and feasible before they can be implemented.
The following criterion reflects DOE's special concern in the area of criticality (and is an addition to BK's original list).	
Nonproliferation	Technologies that would allow a nation to develop a nuclear weapon program <i>must not be exported</i> .

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What's an MCTL?

Export Administration Act (1979)

Beginning in 1976 with the publication of the Bucy Report, which called attention to the national security problem posed by the export of some critical and dual use technologies, DoD has been compiling a critical technologies list.

In 1979, a formal mechanism for that list was mandated by the Export Administration Act (EAA), which gave DoD lead responsibility for assembling a Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and Commerce responsibility for implementation and enforcement.

The EAA was up for renewal in 1983, but the Senate could not agree on a new version, so the President imposed an Executive Order that is expected to remain in effect until final passage of the new Bill. The new EAA, when enacted, almost certainly will continue to mandate an MCTL. (The Newsletter will describe provisions of the new Act as soon as possible).

The MCTL was mandated by the EAA to emphasize for each critical technology, the "arrays of design and manufacturing know-how; keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment; and goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or maintenance know-how which are not possessed by countries to which exports are controlled...and which, if exported, would permit a significant advance in a military system" of any such country.

The EAA further states that the MCTL should be "sufficiently specific to guide the determination of any official exercising export licensing responsibilities under this Act" Although efforts are

continually being made to make it more specific, the existing MCTL does not meet this criterion; furthermore, those who have been working closely with the MCTL have found this directive in the Act to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement.

As DoD has developed the MCTL, the principal focus has been on controlling technology transfer to the Soviet Bloc, but DOE has also emphasized nuclear nonproliferation concerns in its input to the MCTL.

Style and purpose

Calling the MCTL a "list" is somewhat misleading because it consists of encyclopedia-like prose sections that describe technologies as well as concise statements of the critical elements needed to implement each technology.

MCTL contributors strive to write clear, simple, readable, and accurate descriptions of each technology and subdivision of that technology and to characterize succinctly the rationale for that technology being considered militarily critical. These description and rationale sections can be useful to policy makers who need to familiarize themselves with technologies outside their background areas.

Though the MCTL is not in itself a control document, it is a useful reference for developing control lists. For example, the MCTL is being used to establish a US position for international export control regulations by the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), which consists of NATO members plus Japan less Iceland and Spain, and has been used in developing

a list of gas-centrifuge-related components that have been incorporated into the internationally recognized Zangger trigger list.

In addition to the main text, Supporting Documentation is being developed to provide further technical notes and to describe foreign capabilities for each technology.

With its Supporting Documentation, the MCTL is becoming recognized as a useful technology reference for any form of technology transfer control, such as trade shows, technical data transfer, and foreign visits and exchanges. For security review purposes, the MCTL can serve as a flag to identify material that may require wider review as well as an indicator for intelligence targeting.

The MCTL has been revised, refined, reorganized, and reedited annually since 1979. DoD has a contract with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) for coordinating work on the MCTL and for producing the finished document after each revision. The mechanism used by IDA for MCTL review and revision is the Technical Working Group (TWG), which comprises representatives from executive departments and industry.

Because technology transfer control can have a strong impact on industry, IDA and DoD got industry input in 1982 by submitting the MCTL for review by the Multi-Association Policy Advisory Group (MAPAG), composed entirely of industry representation.

DOE's MCTL Team

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Soviets have parity with the US.

Problems associated with understanding Soviet technology and the resultant difficulty in arriving at accurate and current comparative US-Soviet technology assessments have forced the Intelligence-R&D-Industrial communities into polarized spheres of technology interests, each with varying degrees of expertise. As a result, technological surprise for a given technology becomes difficult to define, and, if construed as supporting a parochial interest, difficult to defend to policy and decision makers. Unfortunately, this difficulty tends to weaken efforts to prevent such surprise.

To assess current S&T, STIC enlists the aid of qualified scientists and engineers in the S&T centers, the various national level intelligence agencies and government departments, and, most importantly, national laboratories.

Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National Laboratories, through DOE, provide an understanding of the leading edge in many S&T areas of interest through their effective participation in STIC working groups.

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By producing timely and accurate assessments, collection guides, and other finished intelligence products, STIC is ensuring that US policy and decision makers have for their consideration those intelligence tools necessary to the prevention of technological surprise and, hence, the promotion of national security.

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